Another argument for qualified monism

Photo by Stefano Ferretti on Unsplash

In a previous post I presented three arguments for qualified monism over classical theism. In this post I will give a more general argument for the superiority of qualified monism not only over classical theism but even over neo-classical alternatives. Here is the argument.

Suppose first that God and the world of finite beings are both (i) absolutely distinct and (ii) related to one another. By “absolutely distinct,” I mean the kind of distinction that obtains between two complete things that are not related to one another in a whole-part relation. Thus, two cats are absolutely distinct, as are Peter and Paul, as are the cities of Phoenix and Los Angeles, and so on. The idea that God and the world of finite beings are absolutely distinct is thus to say that both God and the world exist without the one being a part of the other. To suppose that they are related to one another follows right away from the fact that God is supposed to be the cause of the existence of the world of finite beings. A cause and its effect are obviously related to one another in some way or other irrespective of how we might want to fill in the details. At the very least, the effect receives its existence from the cause.

Now for a few abstract principles. If A and B are both absolutely distinct and related to one another, then they are both contained and situated within a greater context or plane that includes them both. And if two absolutely distinct and related things are contained and situated within a greater context that includes them both, then this context itself must be greater than either of them considered individually. Both of these principles are very clear. If one dog is to be located to the left of another, then both of these dogs must be situated within one and the same spatial world. And if they are both to be situated within the same spatial world, then this world obviously has to be larger than either of them considered individually. Or if one number is to be greater than another, then both of these numbers must be situated within one and the same set of numbers that can be ordered according to size. And if both of these numbers are situated within one and the same set, then clearly the set is greater than either of them considered individually.

Now for the argument. If God and the world of finite beings are both (i) absolutely distinct and (ii) related to one another, then they are both contained and situated within a greater context or plane that includes them both. And if God and the world as both absolutely distinct and related to one another are contained within a greater context that includes them both, then this greater context is greater than either of them considered individually. But nothing can be greater than God. He is not contained by anything. As the Bible says: “But who is able to build him a house, since heaven, even highest heaven, cannot contain him?” (2 Chr. 2:6). This implies that God and the world are not both contained and situated within a greater context or plane that includes them both. And this in turn means that God and the world of finite beings either are not absolutely distinct or else are not related.

To deny that God and the world of finite beings are related is the same as denying that this world exists because of God. An effect must be related to its cause. Presumably a theist who is a “realist” will not take this route. This means that the only other possibility is that of denying that God and the world of finite beings are absolutely distinct. They are not “two things” in the matter of two cats or two human beings. They may certainly remain distinct insofar as God is the cause and source of the existence of the world of finite beings. But they are not absolutely distinct because they relate to one another as whole to part. The world is a part of God that he causes to exist. And this is what qualified monism says.

This is therefore a reason for accepting qualified monism and rejecting both classical and neo-classical theism: it better does justice to the ultimacy of God. To say that God cannot be contained by anything and is not simply one more thing relating to other things within some sphere of reality is to make God himself the context of everything else. But insofar as God is also supposed to be the cause of the existence of everything finite and derivative, it therefore makes most sense to think of him as the whole of which everything else whatsoever is a self-affected part.